Challenges in combating corruption: Lessons from Indonesia

Adnan Topan Husodo, Deputy Coordinator, Indonesia Corruption Watch

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was formed on the argument that corruption in Indonesia had become extraordinary crime. Therefore, Indonesia needed to establish a new law-enforcement agency that was also extraordinary, because conventional law enforcement officers—police and public attorneys—were not combating corruption. In fact, Indonesia’s condition has not changed much. A 2009 report of Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) found that there were 40 cases of corruption involving big fish that remained unresolved and which tended to be suspended. The judicial mafia has gripped law enforcement, while on the other hand Indonesia has continued to be categorized as among the most corrupt countries in Asia and in the world.

A recent case that has given evidence to us that the conspiracy between law-enforcement officers and corruptors is still preserved was the criminal case opened against two members of the KPK, Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra M. Hamzah. Police headquarters named both Bibit and Chandra as suspects in criminal acts. Recorded conversations between the brother of a businessman under investigation over a procurement project involving the Department of Forestry and staff of the Attorney General together with the police officer who opened the case in the Constitutional Court revealed that they had together manufactured the case against Bibit and Chandra.

The commission came into existence through Law No. 30 of 2002, which gives it some privileges as an independent institution. The five KPK commissioners are chosen through an open selection process, involving broad public participation and more accountability. There are two stages in the election of candidates. The selection phase involves a selection committee. The next stage is for the candidates?names to go to parliament. The selection committee, established by the president, should include representatives of academics, community leaders, religious leaders, NGOs, and the government. Once elected, the commissioners are not under the control of the president, parliament or other institutions, but still are accountable under article 19 of the law through the delivery of their work report to the president and parliament, the financial audit by the State Audit Agency, as well as annual performance reporting to the public.

Under article 6 of Law No. 30, 2002 the commission has greater powers than other law-enforcement agencies to coordinate anti-corruption efforts with other officers, supervise activities to eradicate corruption, conduct investigations, indict and prosecute corruption cases, prevent corruption, and monitor the governing of the state. Under article 8 the commission has special authority to conduct wiretapping, order travel bans of suspects, request information related to banking transactions of suspects, order banks and relevant institutions to block accounts, request wealth and tax data, order supervisors to suspend suspects from service, suspend transaction activities, and to seek assistance from Interpol Indonesia or law-enforcement agencies of other countries to conduct arrests, raids, detentions and confiscations in corruption cases under investigation.

Performance of the KPK

After almost five years of its agenda to eradicate corruption in Indonesia, the commission has found a place in the hearts of the Indonesian people. The KPK’s performance in handling corruption cases has been deemed successful enough to answer the public thirst for justice.

Public officials who had legal immunity before the existence of the KPK can be processed under the law for complicity in corruption. Some members of parliament, in-laws (besan) of the president, law-enforcement officers, an ex-minister, a director of the Central Bank, regional heads, businessman and brokers have been put in jail because of corruption.

Corruption cases handled against officials by the KPK

(Source: ICW Performance Evaluation Reports on KPK, 2007?9)

Similarly, the corruption assets returned to the state account are relatively large compared with the state budget allocation used to finance the commission’s operations. According to a KPK press release, in 2009 it even saved potential losses to the state from the extractive sector worth more than four trillion rupiah.

The role of the commission is increasingly significant in the agenda to eradicate corruption in Indonesia, and has affected the global perception of Indonesia. In the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) survey of Transparency International, Indonesia’s position globally has improved. The CPI of Indonesia in 2007 was only 2.3; in 2008 it rose to 2.6, and in 2009 it again increased, to 2.8. However, Indonesia cannot be categorized as good in combating corruption, since on the CPI scale Indonesia is still in the category of the perceived corruption-prone countries. This is clear if we compare the CPI of Indonesia with other countries in Southeast Asia. In 2009, Indonesia was still behind Thailand (3.3), Malaysia (4.5), and Singapore and Brunei Darussalam (5.5).

The problems of the KPK

Despite the success of the commission in boosting public confidence about the eradication of widespread corruption in Indonesia and the global community’s appraisal of the good progress in fighting corruption, the KPK still faces problems that cannot be taken lightly. These fall into two categories. The first is the commission’s internal problems, and the second is the political environment (external problems).

The main internal problem for the KPK that hinders its work to eradicate corruption is the composition of the commission’s investigators, who are from other law-enforcement agencies (police and prosecutors). Looking at allegedly corrupt actors whose cases the commission handled in 2007, 2008 and 2009, there were only three law-enforcement officers. In 2009, the commission did not successfully process any law-enforcement officers. This internal problem is hampering the free movement of the commission because commission investigators from the police and prosecution still have direct superiors in the police and prosecution. So it is impossible for these investigators to examine their bosses in the police and Attorney General’s office, even though under article 11 of Law No. 30, 2002 the commission’s mandate covers law-enforcement officers. This is best illustrated in the Bank of Century scandal, which involves former National Police Chief Susno Duadji. Up to now the KPK appears unable to address the case quickly.

Externally, one thing blocking the commission’s efforts to eradicate corruption is weakening support from some quarters, especially from the political elite. Politically, the eradication of corruption has not received much support. So far only civil society groups and the mass media have seriously promoted the eradication of corruption. The reason is that the commission’s agenda has become a serious threat to corrupt public officials and corrupt political party elites. Parliament is no longer immune from the legal process for the corruption that began and flourished there.

Threatened political figures and their allies have used or have contemplated using the following methods to try and weaken the commission:

1. Disarming the commission’s law-enforcement authority

The important factor why the commission has succeeded in uncovering cases of corruption is its special authority, including wiretap authority. Many House members were arrested after the commission had power to intercept telephone calls. So it is not surprising that members of the House have tried to cut the authority of the commission to conduct wiretaps. Fortunately, efforts of members to revoke the wiretapping authority have so far failed due to the strong reaction from civil society groups and journalists. However, the government has secretly arranged the Draft Government Regulation (RPP) on surveillance as a means to undermine the commission. If the RPP is approved, the commission will have to report all wiretapping plans to the executive. Until now, the ICW is advocating that the government cancel the RPP.

2. Criminal case against commissioners

As mentioned above, in 2009 one attempt to weaken the commission was by constructing a scenario and engineering legal proceedings against two commissioners of the KPK.

A movement against the criminal case started from a statement of former National Police Chief Susno Duadji, who said that the KPK is a lizard (cicak) and the police are a crocodile (buaya). This metaphor led to Cicak Versus Buaya as a symbol of resistance against the criminalization of the commission by Police Headquarters. Cicak was then interpreted as “Cinta Indonesia Cinta KPK?(Love Indonesia Love KPK).

The CICAK movement began on 12 July 2009, with the ICW as one of the initiators. After the declaration, this movement emerged in various regions. CICAK protests have invited responses from the president, who stepped in and formed Team 8 to evaluate the legal process against the two commissioners. Ultimately, the team recommended that the case be stopped. The Attorney General then issued a decision to terminate prosecution.

3. Political hostages in the recruitment of candidates for commissioner

Although the recruitment mechanism of candidates for commissioner is quite accountable and transparent, political groups still have a big opportunity to control the KPK because the final decision on those elected as commissioners is in parliament’s hands. Parliament as the most corrupt institution has an interest in selecting candidates that will not undermine its interests.

Lessons from the fit and proper test mechanism of parliament in 2007 indicated that the priorities of parliament are mostly contradictory to public priorities. According to the Coalition of Judicial Monitoring, several candidates who in the public assessment were suitable to be commissioners were not elected by parliament, while a controversial figure was made KPK chairman. As a result, some cases involving big fish have not been processed due to debts of gratitude or political deals.

Conclusion

Because the issue of corruption in Indonesia is more fertile and sustained due to the corrupt relationships between politicians, businessmen and law-enforcement agencies, the independent anti-corruption agency needs to have large authority. However, corruption is increasingly sophisticated and hard to fight with the usual strategies. Anti-corruption institutions should be independent in a broad sense, and free from any influence of power. Therefore, the KPK needs to recruit staff investigators directly, not take them from the police and prosecution.

In fact, significant support for the commission’s mission has emerged only from civil society and the mass media. So it is very important for the commission to develop a strategy on how to build support and mobilization of public influence to strengthen its position vis-a-vis corrupt state institutions. One strategy to maintain that support is to give more serious attention to standstill corruption cases in regions. With the intervention of the commission, cases of corruption in the regions can be resolved. I believe that this strategy would increase public support for the KPK.

One important reason that eradication of corruption is very slow is that there is no synergy with other law-enforcement agencies. The Attorney General’s office and the police are institutions that are still perceived to be corrupt, making it difficult or impossible to believe that prosecutors and police have strong will to eradicate corruption. Therefore, the commission must clear up these two institutions through the disclosure of corruption cases involving law-enforcement officers.

Eradication of corruption is a transnational issue and therefore international instruments can be used to make anti-corruption institutions much stronger. In the case of Indonesia, civil society groups submitted a report on the systematic weakening of the commission to a conference of the United Nations Commission Against Corruption. International pressure can help protect the existence of an independent anti-corruption agency.